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Overcoming Adversity: Distinguishing
Retaliation from General Prohibitions
Under Federal Employment
Discrimination Law
ERic M.D. ZION*
INTRODUCTION
In Japan, a rubber company demanded a senior researcher enter early retirement at
fifty-three years of age.' He refused, and in response, the company moved him out of
his office into the corner of the factory with only a bare desk for furniture.2 His new
job, according to the company, was to turn in a report on the same topic every two
weeks entitled "My Second Life."3 Meanwhile, in the United States, Jean Mattem,
a mechanic-apprentice, suffered sexual harassment by two senior mechanics on the
job.4 As a result, she filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC" or "Commission")5 and ultimately settled with
the company.6 Mattern returned to work with her new crew but began encountering
problems.7 One day she went home ill, and two supervisors showed up at her home
demanding she report to the company's medical department.8 Days later, Matter was
reprimanded for not being at her work station when, in actuality, she was in a human
resource department meeting. Coworkers became hostile to her, muttering"accidents
happen," and none of them even acknowledged her with a simple "hello."'i
Supervisors, who previously praised her work, now gave her poor evaluations and
one even threatened termination." Finally, Mattem's locker at work was broken into,
and her tools were stolen. 2 The workplace strain overwhelmed Mattem, causing her
* J.D. Canidate, 2001, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; B.A., 1998,
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1. Smart v. Ball State Univ., 89 F.3d 437,441 n.1 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing Sheryl WuDunn,
When Lifetime Jobs Die Prematurely, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1996, at Dl).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Mattem v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 703-04 (5th Cir. 1997).
5. The EEOC is the federal agency charged with investigating and enforcing equal
employment opportunity laws, including the federal law which prohibits sexual harassment in
the workplace. See MARK A. PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW § 5.02 (1988).
6. Mattern, 104 F.3d at 704. As part of the settlement, the company requested one of the
harassers retire early and did not discipline the other, instead transferring Mattem to another
crew under the same departmental supervisors. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 705.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 705-06.
12. Id. at 705.
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to see a doctor and resign.'3
In the aforementioned cases, each employee was subjected to retaliation for
objecting to an employer's practice. However, in the second case the employee,
Mattern, pursued a civil action against her employer alleging unlawful employment
practices 4 under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"),'5 which
prohibits sexual harassment in the workplace 6 and entitles an employee to protection
from retaliation for engaging in what is deemed "protected activity."' 7 Mattern
brought her action in a Texas federal district court alleging both sexual harassment
and retaliation, receiving a judgment in her favor on her claim of retaliation."8 The
company won on appeal because the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that
the actions taken by the company did not constitute retaliation within the meaning of
Title VII. "
Enacted in 1964, Title VII targets discrimination in employment practices hoping
to equalize the workplace for all individuals.2" The statute's general provisions bar
discrimination by an employer because of an individual's race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin.2' As with many federal statutes, a section of Tite VII contains
13. Id. at 706.
14. Id. at 704.
15. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to -17 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
16. See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66-67 (1986).
17. Section 704(a)(1) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1994), reads as follows:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate
against any of his employees or applicants for employment,... because he has
opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter
[Title VII], or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in
any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.
See also Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337,339 (1997) (interpreting section 704(a)(1)
to cover former employees within the meaning of "employees"). See generally PLAYER, supra
note 5, § 5.27 (discussing Title VII's articulation provision).
18. Mattern, 104 F.3d at 704.
19. Id. at 708, 710. The Court's holding was subject to a vigorous dissent:
Because I believe that the majority's decision is contrary to the clear statutory
language, the Supreme Court decisions, and all prior jurisprudence, and that it
will drastically weaken § 704(a)'s protection against retaliation for those who
participate in the enforcement of Title VII by immunizing employers who use
hostile environment discrimination vengefully against them, I must respectfully
dissent.
Id. at 720 (Dennis, J., dissenting). Ironically, according to the Seventh Circuit, the plight of the
Japanese senior researcher in his comer desk would have been a sufficient adverse action had
it occurred in the United States. Smart v. Ball State Univ., 89 F.3d 437, 441 n.1 (7th Cir.
1996).
20. MeritorSav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 64; H.R. REP. No. 88-914, at 26 (1963) ("The purpose
of this title is to eliminate, through the utilization of formal and informal remedial procedures,
discrimination in employment based upon race, color, religion, or national origin."); see also
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971) ("The objective of Congress in the
enactment of Title VII is plain from the language of the statute. It was to achieve equality of
employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an
identifiable group of white employees over other employees.").
21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78
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a provision barring retaliation by an employer if an employee opposes unlawful
employment practices or utilizes the enforcement mechanisms under the statute.'
Section 704(a) of Title VII protects employees who engage in protected activity, thus
"[m]aintaining unfettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms."'24 Charges of
retaliation, such as the one brought by Mattem, are being brought in increasing
numbers under equal employment opportunity statutes, thus creating a need for
judicial interpretation of the retaliation provisions.' Unfortunately, section 704(a)
lacks any substantial legislative history to provide guidance to the courts. 6
The Supreme Court recently tackled section 704(a) in Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.'
Reversing a decision of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court
interpreted the section to include former employees within the meaning of
"employees."' Justice Thomas, speaking for a unanimous Court, declared that the
Fourth Circuit's definition limiting section 704(a) to current employees would be
"destructive of [the] purpose of the antiretaliation provision.' 29 However, a recent
split among the circuits creates a new issue under section 704(a) ripe for review by
the Supreme Court.3" The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, among others, limited the
term "discriminate" in section 704(a) to "ultimate employment decisions," such as
hiring and firing.3 InMattem's case, the company did not retaliate against her within
the meaning of section 704(a),because she did not suffer a sufficiently adverse action
(1998).
22. SeeNational LaborRelations Act (NLRA) § 8(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (1994); Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA) of 1938 § 15(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (1994).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)(l).
24. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997).
25. The past several years have seen a consistent rise in the percentage of
retaliation charges filed with the EEOC. See Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, Charge Statistics for FY 1992 Through FY 1998 (Oct. 14, 1999), at
http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/charges.html (last modified Jan. 12,2000); see also Teresa L. Butler
& A. Michael Weber, Retaliation Lawsuits Are IncreasingRapidly, NAT'LL.J., Jan. 11, 1999,
atB5 (noting significant increase and predicting that retaliation claims "will undoubtedly climb
and may eventually constitute the single largest percentage of charges processed by the EEOC
and parallel state agencies").
26. See McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84 F.3d 256, 262 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting in regards to
section 704(a) that "there is no pertinent legislative history"); Donna P. Fenn, Note, Robinson
v. Shell Oil Co.: ProvidingFormer Employees with Protection from Retaliation, 15 HoFsTRA
LAB. & EMP. L.J. 539, 539 (1998) ("[T]here is a lack of legislative history regarding this
portion of Title VII.").
27. 519 U.S. 337 (1997).
28. Id. at 346.
29. Id.
30. Rayv. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234,1240-42(9th Cir. 2000) (noting circuit split on issue
and citing cases); Burger v. Cent. Apartment Mgmt., Inc., 168 F.3d 875, 878 n.3 (5th Cir.
1999); Wideman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 141 F.3d 1453, 1456 (11th Cir. 1998); see also
Melissa A. Essary& Terence D. Friedman, Retaliation Claims Under Title VII, theADEA, and
the ADA: Untouchable Employees, Uncertain Employers, Unresolved Courts, 63 Mo. L. REv.
115, 152 (1998) ("The most pressing issue is the question of what constitutes 'adverse
employment action."').
31. Mattem v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 708 (5th Cir. 1997).
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by the company on an ultimate employment decision.32 However, the majority of
circuits do not restrict section 704(a)'s language to such a reading but instead include
lesser adverse actions with some minimum level of substantiality.33
The importance of the Supreme Court's decision on this issue is immense. A broad
interpretation of section 704(a) would require employers to keep careful records of
the management of employees previously or currently involved in statutorily
protected activity.34 Indeed, such a reading places severe restrictions on the ability of
an employer to discipline an employee who has engaged in protected activity.35
However, a narrow interpretation of the provision would seriously defeat the
effectiveness of the section by deterring employee cooperation in enforcement. 6
Although an employer may not take adverse action on an ultimate employment
decision, discrimination based on retaliatory motives may come in the form of various
workplace slights not covered by a narrow interpretation.31 The issue balances the
ability of an employer to manage his or her employees with the remedial purposes of
antidiscrimination laws.3 Considering the recent decision in Robinson, the Supreme
Court will most likely give section 704(a) a broad reading and agree with the majority
of circuits, an interpretation consistent with the antiretaliation provision's goals and
language.
This Note addresses the current circuit split on the issue, specifically, whether
section 704(a) should be read broadly. Part I explores the limited legislative history
and distinguishes section 704(a) froffi the general provisions to provide a background
for the discussion. Part II addresses the viewpoint held by the majority of circuits
regarding section 704(a) and the reasoning of those courts. Next, Part III provides an
analysis of the minority view held by several circuits. Finally, in light of recent
Supreme Court decisions, Part IV concludes with the probable interpretation the
Court will give section 704(a) and why this is the appropriate definition. Although
the reasoning of this Note targets primarily section 704(a) of Title VII, the reasoning
may apply with equal persuasion to the similar antiretaliation provision under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA").39
32. Id.
33. Wideman, 141 F.3d at 1456 ("We join the majority of circuits which have addressed
the issue and hold that Title VII's protection against retaliatory discrimination extends to
adverse actions which fall short of ultimate employment decisions.... [W]e do not doubt that
there is some threshold level of substantiality ... 2).
34. See Butler & Weber, supra note 25, at B10 (emphasizing the importance of training
supervisors in company complaint mechanisms to "identify and document when original
complaints occurred").
35. See infra notes 161-62 and accompanying text.
36. Wideman, 141 F.3d at 1456 ("Permitting employers to discriminate against an
employee who files a charge of discrimination so long as the retaliatory discrimination does not
constitute an ultimate employment action, could stifle employees' willingness to file charges
of discrimination.").
37. See infra notes 131-36 and accompanying text.
38. See Laughlin v. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253,259 (4th Cir. 1998).
39. 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1994). Under the ADEA:
It shall be unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees
or applicants for employment ... because such individual ... has opposed any
[Vol. 76:191
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I. BACKGROUND
A general understanding of section 704(a)'s history and usageprovides abackdrop
to consider the viewpoints held by the majority and minority of circuits. First, the
limited legislative history demonstrates that Congress intended section 704(a) to be
construed broadly. Second, section 704(a) must be distinguished from the general
prohibitions in its language and application to demonstrate the broad coverage of the
provision.
A. A Brief History of Section 704(a)
During the 1950s and 1960s, prior to the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
the country suffered from constant social turmoil and racial tension. 0 Much of the
crisis during this era stemmed from federal efforts to integrate schools and enforce
minority voting rights.4' The civil rights movement of these two decades initiated the
passage ofbroad laws aimed at remedying racial discrimination.42 In the midst of this
tension, Congress recognized the need to eliminate the barriers to minorities in
obtaining employment.43 Beginning in the late 1950s and continuing up to 1964,
members of Congress proposed individual and omnibus statutes containing multiple
titles designed to eradicate discrimination in voting, public accommodation,
education, and employment.O Two of these bills are worthy of comment in construing
section 704(a).
In 1962, the Chairman of the House Committee on Education and Labor,
Congressman Adam Clayton Powell, submitted a bill, House Bill 10144, entitled
"Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1962."' 5 Powell, a Democrat from New
York, introduced the legislation as "a solution for the problem of continuing arbitrary
employment discrimination because ofrace, religion, color, national origin, ancestry,
practice made unlawful by this section, or because such individual ... has made
a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation,
proceeding, or litigation under this chapter.
Id. § 623(d); see also Doe v. DeKalb County Sch. Dist., 145 F.3d 1441, 1447-48 (11th Cir.
1998) (noting reliance on Title VII and ADEA cases interchangeably for guidance on adverse
employment action); Hashimoto v. Dalton, 118 F.3d 671,675 n.1 (9th Cir. 1997) (relying on
ADEA case as guidance in Title VII antiretaliation claim and noting that cases interpreting the
parallel provisions may serve as same).
40. Robert D. Loevy, Introduction: The Background and Setting ofthe CivilRightsAct of
1964, in THE CiI RIGHTs ACT OF 1964: THE PASSAGE OF THE LAW THAT ENDED RACIAL
SEGREGATION 1, 25-42 (Robert D. Loevy ed., 1997).
41. Id.
42. See id.
43. See H.R. REP. No. 87-1370, at 1 (1962) (stating that "50 percent of the people of the
United States in search of employment suffer some kind ofjob opportunity discrimination
because of their race, religion, color, national origin, ancestry, or age").
44. See EQUALEMPLOYMENTOPPORTUNITYCOMM'N, LEGISLATIVEHISTORYOFTm.EsVII
ANDXI OF CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 3-10 (1968).
45. 108 CONG. REC. 2707(1962); EQUALEMPLOYMENTOPPORTUNITYCOMM'N, supra note
44, at 9.
2001]
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or age." The intent of the bill was to create an EEOC and allow the EEOC to
enforce the law through the judicial process-strikingly similar to the modem day
Title VII.47 A provision in the Powell bill addressed retaliation against employees for
engaging in protected activity.48 The House committee report approving the Powell
bill commented that the retaliation provision "makes it an unlawful employment
practice for an employer.., to discriminate in any manner against another person
because he has [engaged in protected activity]."49 The language of the report clearly
states that the Powell bill had no requirement that the discrimination be an ultimate
employment action such as hiring or firing-discrimination by the employer could
take any form. Ultimately, the Powell bill failed to clear the House Rules
Committee. °
One year later, another Democrat from New York and Chairman of the House
Judiciary Committee, Congressman Emanuel Cellar, introduced a bill based on
President John F. Kennedy's recommendations to Congress.5 The Cellar bill,
designed as omnibus civil rights legislation, contained ten titles.52 Title VII of the
Cellar bill was given the name "Equal Employment Opportunity" and actually
developed as a late amendment, offered by Congressman Peter Rodino 3 In section
705(a) of Title VII, the modem day section 704(a) is found. 4 The minority view of
the committee, which opposed approval, criticized the enforcement procedures ofthe
Cellar bill because "[i]n essence, this was the approach and the provisions of a similar
bill, H.R. 10144, reported in February of 1962 by the House Education and Labor
Committee in the 87th Congress."" Thus, arguably, the Powell bill of 1962 served
as the origin of the language for Title VII.
Title VII developed little official legislative history in committee except for that
available from the House Judiciary Committee's report to Congress, which was
attached to the omnibus bill. Unfortunately, that report contained no helpful
explanation of the terms within Title VII, in particular section 704(a).' Indeed, the
only commentary on the section by the report was in language nearly verbatim to the
46. H.R. REP. No. 87-1370, at 1 (1962).
47. Compare H.R. 10144, 87th Cong. § 8 (1962), and H.R. REP. No. 87-1370, at 11-15,
with 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4 to -5 (1994).
48. H.R. 10144; H.R. REP. No. 87-1370, at 11.
49. H.R. REP. No. 87-1370, at 11 (emphasis added).
50. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, supra note 44, at 9.
51. H.R. REP. No. 88-914, at 16 (1963) (accompanying the Cellar bill, H.R. 7152, 88th
Cong. § 705(a) (1963)); EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, supra note 44, at 9. In
regard to employment discrimination and the importance of such legislation, President
Kennedy was quoted as saying: "There can be no more significant case for our democratic form
of government than the achievement of equality in all our institutions and practices-and
particularly in employment opportunities." 110 CONG. REc. 2733 (1964).
52. H.R.REP.No. 88-914, at 17-18.
53. CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA G. WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE 1964 CryvL RIGHTS ACT 35 (1985).
54. Compare H.R. 7152,88th Cong. § 705(a) (1963), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1994).
55. H.R. REP. No. 88-914, at 57.
56. Id.
[Vol. 76:191
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section itself.' Members of the committee who disagreed with the omnibus bill's
approval commented on the complete lack of consideration by the committee of the
language used in Title VII: "The Judiciary Committee or its subcommittee held no
hearings on the language of title VII. Representatives of neither industry nor labor
had their day in court before the Judiciary Committee and the Judiciary Committee
members had no part in producing the phraseology title VII contains.""8
Congressman Dowdy, a Democrat fromTexas, commented on the House floor during
debate that "[n]owhere in the bill is the word 'discrimination' defined," and "[tihis
is one title that the Judicial Committee did not have any hearings on."59
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 passed both houses of Congress through an expedited
and unusual process, resulting in inadequate legislative history.' In the end, section
704(a) received almost no attention by Congress. On the House floor, Congressman
Watson, a Republican from South Carolina, made the only attempt to amend section
704(a) of Title VII.6 ' Proposed and rejected on the last day of debate, the Watson
amendment allowed employers to retaliate against employees for bringing charges the
validity of which was not confirmed by the Commission or a federal court.62
Congressman Watson explained that under the amended section, "an employer would
not be required to consider a chronic troublemaker or professional complaint filer
either for employment or promotion."63 The logical inference from Congressman
57. Compare H.R. 7152 ("It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
discriminate against any of his employees.., because he has opposed any practice made an
unlawful employment practice by this title, orbecause he has made a charge, testified, assisted,
or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this title."), with
H.R. REP. No. 88-914, at 27-28 (stating that the section "makes it an unlawful employment
practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees... because he has made
a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in the enforcement of the title").
58. H.R. REP. No. 88-914, at 57.
59. 110 CoNG. REc. 1632 (1964). Later, Mr. Dowdy made an interesting historical
statement regarding Title VII: "When Attorney General Robert Kennedy appeared'before our
committee, after this [Title VII] was placed in the bill, he advised against including it." Id.
However, prdponents of the bill attempted to clarify the definition of discrimination: ."[T]o
discriminate is to make a distinction, to make a difference in treatment or favor."' Ernest F.
Lidge, III, The Meaning ofDiscrimination: Why Courts Have Erred in RequiringEmployment
Discrimination Plaintiffs to Prove That the Employer's Action Was Materially Adverse or
Ultimate, 47 U. KAN. L.REv. 333,373 (1999) (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S.
228, 244 (1989) (quoting 110 CONG. REC. 7213)).
60. See Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., The Role of the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights in the
Civil Rights Struggle of 1963-1964, in THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964: THE PASSAGE OF THE
LAW THAT ENDED RACIAL SEGREGATION, supra note 40, at 64-75.
61. See EQUAL EPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, supra note 44, at app.
62. 110 CONG. REc. 2729. Compare the absence of legislative history on such a small
section with the nonexistent legislative history surrounding the inclusion of "sex" as a
protected class under the statute. Id. at 2577-84. The amendment introduced by Congressman
Smith to include "sex" was actually an attempt to defeat the bill. WHALEN & WHALEN, supra
note 53, 115-18; see also PLAYER, supra note 5, § 5.03.
63. 110 CONG. REc. 2730. Congressman Watson continued: "Certainly the businessman
should be afforded that degree of protection against the professional complaint filer or
casemaker who will inevitably develop as a natural aftermath of the passage of this iniquitous
2001]
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Watson's comment is that the unamended language was broad enough to include such
"problem" employees. Despite these concerns and a remarkable lack of legislative
history, Title VII, including section 704(a), became the law of the land.
B. Section 704(a) Distinguishedfrorn General Prohibitions
Under Title VII
As interpreted today, Title VII is considered a broad remedial statute that courts
interpret liberally." As opposed to the narrowly construed general provisions
prohibiting discrimination based upon a protected status such as race, the prohibition
against retaliation under section 704(a) has broader language and is liberally
construed by a majority of circuits.
In the general provisions, Title VII prohibits discrimination based upon an
individual's protected status of"race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."' Under
Title VII, it is an unlawful employment practice "to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment... to
limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants" in order to deprive an
individual of employment opportunities because ofthe individual's protected status.6
After the Supreme Court's decision in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,' a
plaintiff may demonstrate discrimination by establishing a prima facie case, at which
point the burden shifts to the defendant.68 Under McDonnell Douglas, a prima facie
case allows a plaintiff to create a "presumption of discrimination" through
circumstantial evidence.69 For example, a plaintiff meets his initial burden of proving
that an employer failed to promote him because of his race by demonstrating that (1)
he is a member of a protected class (e.g., African-American), (2) he sought and was
denied a promotion for which he was qualified, and (3) his employer promoted
another employee outside the protected class (e.g., fellow Caucasian employee).70
Once the plaintiff establishes his prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant
to demonstrate that the failure to promote was for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
business reason (e.g., fellow employee had greater academic credentials and plaintiff
had disciplinary problems).7' Once the defendant articulates a nondiscriminatory
casemaker who will inevitably develop as a natural aftermath of the passage of this iniquitous
bill." Id.
64. Berry v. Stevinson Chevrolet, 74 F.3d 980, 986 (i0th Cir. 1996).
65. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994).
66. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2).
67. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
68. Id. at802-03 (evtablishingaburden-shiffdng scheme for Title VII claims for relief); see,
e.g., Harlston v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 37 F.3d 379 (8th Cir. 1994) (demonstrating prima
facie case of race and age discrimination requires the plaintiff to show "1) she was a member
of the protected class; 2) she was meeting the legitimate expectations of her employer; 3) she
suffered an adverse employment action; and 4) she was replaced by a younger, white person").
69. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; see also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
Prod., Inc., 120 S. Ct. 2097, 2106 (2000).
70. Lidge-Myrtil v. Deere & Co., 49 F.3d 1308, 1310 (8th Cir. 1995).
71. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-03; Lidge-Myrtil, 49 F.3d at 1310.
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reason, the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the reason is
pretextual. 2
A retaliation claim may be incorporated into the traditional McDonnell Douglas
burden-shifting framework.73 A plaintiff alleging such a claim has the initial burden
of proving three essential elements under the framework.74 First, the employee must
engage in protected activity under Title VII. Traditionally, protected activity is
separated into two categories: (1) the opposition clause and (2) the participation
clause 5 Underthe opposition clause, an employee engages inprotected activity when
he or she opposes conduct made unlawful under Title VII.76 When the employee
utilizes the enforcement mechanisms of Title VII, such as filing a charge with the
EEOC, the employee is protected in his or her activities by the participation clause.'
Second, the employee must show that the employer took an adverse action against the
employee.78 Finally, the employee must show a causal connection between the
adverse action taken by the employer and the employee's protected activity.79 Once
the employee establishes these three elements, the burden shifts to the employer to
72. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 2106; Lidge-Myrtil, 49 F.3d at 1311. "[A]lthough the presumption
of discrimination 'drops out of the picture' once the defendant meets its burden of production,
the trier of fact may still consider the evidence establishing the plaintiff's prima facie case 'and
inferences properly drawn therefrom... on the issue of whether the defendant's explanation
is pretextual."' Reeves, 530 U.S. at 2106 (omission in original) (citations omitted) (quoting St.
Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993), and Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n.10 (1981), respectively).
73. See, e.g., Miller v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 203 F.3d 997, 1007 (7th Cir. 2000)
(applying McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to retaliation claim); Laughlin v.
Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 258 (4th Cir. 1998); Montandon v. Farmland
Indus., Inc., 116 F.3d 355,359 (8th Cir. 1997); McKenzie v. 111. Dep't of Trans., 92 F.3d 473,
483 (7th Cir. 1996); Berry v. Stevinson Chevrolet, 74 F.3d 980,985 (10th Cir. 1996); Yartzoff
v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1375 (9th Cir. 1987).
74. Burger v. Cent. Apartment Mgmt., Inc., 168 F.3d 875, 878 (5th Cir. 1999); Knox v.
Indiana, 93 F.3d 1327, 1333-34 (7th Cir. 1996); Berry, 74 F.3d at 985; Wyatt v. City of
Boston, 35 F.3d 13, 15 (1st Cir. 1994); Yartzoff, 809 F.2d at 1375. In some circuits, a prima
facie case of retaliation is separated into four elements, the fourth being the employer's
knowledge of the employee's protected activity, but most circuits encompass the knowledge
requirement in the causation element. See, e.g., EEOC v. AveryDennison Corp., 104 F.3d 858,
860 (6th Cir. 1997) (requiring four elements for prima facie case of retaliation); Essary &
Friedman, supra note 30, at 120 n.12 (noting that "courts using only three elements subsume
the fourth element of knowledge into the third element of causation").
75. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1994) (showing the opposition clause to be "because he has
opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice," and the participation clause to
be "because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an
investigation"); see also Wyatt, 35 F.3J. at 15 (distinguishing between the respective clauses).
76. See, e.g., Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental Corp., 85 F.3d 1074, 1085 (3d Cir.* 1996)
(complaining to management regarding discriminatory practices).
77. See, e.g., McKenzie, 92 F.3d at483 n.8 (filing ofcharge with EEOC and participating
in investigation).
78. Burger, 168 F.3d at 878; Knox, 93 F.3d at 1333-34; Berry, 74 F.3d at 985; Wyatt, 35
F.3d at 15; Yartzoff, 809 F.2d at 1375.
79. See, e.g., Wyatt, 35 F.3d at 16 (establishing causation by showing close temporal
proximity between employer learning of protected activity and adverse action).
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demonstrate a nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action."0 If the employer is
successful, the employee may still attack the reason as pretextual.8 Although each
element has its nuances, the gravamen of this discussion will concentrate on what
constitutes "adverse action" within the meaning of section 704(a) to establish the
second element of a prima facie case.
The Supreme Court has provided little interpretive guidance on section 704(a). In
fact, the Court has only addressed this provision on a few occasions, most recently
in Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.82 In Robinson, Justice Thomas, speaking fora unanimous
Court, interpreted the term "employees" within the meaning of the section and
enumerated a procedure for the courts to interpret ambiguous language under the
section.3 The issue before the Court in Robinson was whether the term "employees"
included former employees, thus affording past employees statutoryprotection from
retaliation. 4 According to the opinion, the Court first determined whether the
language had a "plain and unambiguous meaning."85 Justice Thomas explained that
the term "employees" in section 704(a) had no qualifiers and that other sections used
"employees" to have "more inclusive or different" meanings, thus finding the term
ambiguous.86 Considering the broader context of the statute and that a narrow reading
"would effectively vitiate much of the protection afforded by § 704(a)," the Court
broadened the term to include former employees."7
Today, section 704(a) plays a vital role for Title VII with allegations of retaliation
on the rise."8 According to EEOC statistical data, charges of retaliation are steadily
increasing." In 1992, retaliation complaints constituted 14.5% of Title VII charges
of discrimination filed.' Six years later, the same charges account for over twenty-
one percent ofTitle VII charges, and overall retaliation charges have increased by ten
percent of the total charges under all statutes enforced by the EEOC.9 A broad
interpretation of section 704(a) by the Court will continue this increase. For
employers, it would mean increased scrutiny of disciplinary actions taken against
employees who have engaged in protected activity. Management of employees would
be seriously limited by a broad interpretation because most personnel actions would
be subject to Title VII scrutiny. However, the enforcement mechanisms of Title VII
would be seriously hindered if the Court applied a narrow interpretation to section
704(a). Both Title VII plaintiffs and the EEOC critically rely on information from
80. Berry, 74 F.3d at 987; Wyatt, 35 F.3d at 16; Yartzoff, 809 F.2d at 1376.
81. Wyatt, 35 F.3d at 16.
82. 519 U.S. 337 (1997); see also Todd Mitchell, Note, Terminate, Then Retaliate: Title
VII Section 704(a) and Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 75 N.C. L. REV. 376, 387 n.82 (1996).
83. Robinson, 519 U.S. at 340.
84. Id.
85. Id. Justice Thomas further remarked that "[t]he plainness or ambiguity of the statutory
language is determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which the
language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole." Id. at 341.
86. Id. at 342.
87. Id. at 345.
88. See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, supra note 25.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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employees who file charges and those who provide witness testimony. The inability
to assure potential witnesses and charging parties that their employer will not harass
them in retaliation would diminish the agency's ability to conduct an investigation
and eradicate the discrimination.
II MAJORITY VIEW 9
2
"The law deliberately does not take a 'laundry list' approach to
retaliation, because unfortunately its forms are as varied as the
human imagination will permit. ,93
In the majority of circuits, a plaintiff may allege retaliatory conduct by the
employer that does not constitute an ultimate employment decision.94 A plaintiffmay
allege retaliation based upon an ultimate employment decision or may base such a
claim on an isolated or series of lesser adverse actions of the employer. The logic of
the majority is grounded in the broad language of section 704(a) and the underlying
policy concern of protecting the enforcement mechanisms of Title VII.
A. The Majority's Definition ofAdverse Action
Adverse employment actions that give rise to a charge of retaliation may include
demotions, disadvantageous transfers, failure to promote, negative job reviews, and
toleration of co-worker harassment, in addition to actions deemed ultimate such as
discharge or refusal to hire." However, "not everything that makes an employee
unhappy is an actionable adverse action."'96 There must be some level of substantiality
or materiality to the adverse action before a cognizable claim of retaliation may be
made." For example, in Flaherty v. Gas Research Institute,98 the employer changed
the employee's job title and required the employee to report to a former subordinate
after the employee alleged to a company director age discrimination in a work force
reduction.' Responding to the employee's allegation that these actions constituted
retaliation, the court agreed that such actions may create a "bruised ego" but that they
did not rise to the level of adverse employment actions.0" In Blalock v. Dale County
92. The members ofthe majority clearly include the First, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh,
and District of Columbia Circuits. Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1241 (9th Cir. 2000);
Wideman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 141 F.3d 1453, 1456 (11 th Cir. 1998); Knox v. Indiana,
93 F.3d 1327, 1334 (7th Cir. 1996); Berry v. Stevinson Chevrolet, 74 F.3d 980, 984-86 (10th
Cir. 1996); Wyattv. City ofBoston, 35 F.3d 13,15-16 (1st Cir. 1994). The Fourth Circuit may
be leaning in that direction. See infra note 214 and accompanying text.
93. Knox, 93 F.3d at 1334 (emphasis added).
94. Wideman, 141 F.3d at 1456 (citing cases in majority).
95. Id. (listing various actions which may be sufficient for retaliation claim).
96. Smart v. Ball State Univ., 89 F.3d 437,441 (7th Cir 1996).
97. See, e.g., Doe v. Dekalb County Sch. Dist., 145 F.3d 1441, 1452 (11th Cir. 1998)
(declining to extend adverse employment action to a subjective standard of employee).
98. 31 F.3d 451 (7th Cir. 1994).
99. Id. at 457.
100. Id. at 456-57. The court noted however "that an employer does not insulate itself from
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Board of Education,' the school board voted to involuntarily transfer a tenured
teacher and athletic coach to another school with no coaching responsibilities; the
board shortly thereafter rescinded the vote. The teacher had complained of sexual
discrimination and brought suit alleging the initial vote was in retaliation. Granting
summary judgment for the board, the court noted that the teacher "suffered no loss
of pay or any benefit of employment," and therefore "the 'threshold level of
substantiality' [was] not met."'' The Seventh Circuit has been quite clear that purely
lateral transfers ornegative performance evaluations, absent any other adverse actions
on the part of the employer, are not sufficient adverse employment actions under
section 704(a).'03
Yet, the majority's reading of "to discriminate" is not severely restricted so long
as the adverse action is related to employment. "There is nothing in the law of
retaliation that restricts the type of retaliatory act that might be visited upon an
employee who seeks to invoke her rights by filing a complaint. It need only be an
adverse employment action."1" There is no distinct authority on how close the
adverse action must be related to employment.' Even small office slights considered
liability simply by offering a transfer at the same salary and benefits.. . in the following
circumstances[:] ... moving an employee's office to an undesirable location.., an isolated
comer... while forbiddifig her to use the firm's stationary and support services." Id.
(quotations and citations omitted).
101. 84 F. Supp. 2d 1291 (M.D. Ala. 1999).
102. Id. at 1311 (quoting Wideman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 141 F.3d 1453,1456(11thCir.
1998)).
103. Smart v. Ball State Univ., 89 F.3d 437, 441 (7th Cir. 1996). In a more unusual
situation, the Seventh Circuit rejected on its face an argument by one plaintiff that being
overrated on a performance evaluation constituted an adverse employment action. Cullom v.
Brown, 89 F.3d 1035, 1041 (7th Cir. 2000) ("[o]verrating an employee may be a misguided
way of avoiding controversy, but it is not an adverse act, let alone a material one").
104. Knox v. Indiana, 93 F.3d 1327, 1334 (7th Cir. 1996). A few circuits, citing the broad
language of section 704(a), have construed the section to include adverse actions "not
ostensibly employment related" taken by the employer in retaliation for protected activity.
Aviles v. Cornell Forge Co., 183 F.3d 598, 605 (7th Cir. 1999); see also Veprinsky v. Fluor
Daniel, Inc., 87 F.3d 881, 892 (7th Cir. 1996) (listing cases involving threats of violence and
tort civil actions brought by employer as adverse actions).
105. SeeAviles, 183 F.3d at 605 (holding "the language ofthe Title VII retaliation provision
is broad enough to contemplate circumstances where employers might take actions that are not
ostensibly employment related against a current employee"); McKenzie v. 11. Dept. ofTransp.,
92 F.3d 473,485-86 (7th Cir. 1996) (indicating questionable continuing doctrine that adverse
act must be employment related); Passer v. Am. Chem. Soc'y, 935 F.2d 322, 331 (D.C. Cir.
199 1) (finding "illegal retaliation in employer conduct that could not be described strictly as
an 'employment action"'); cf. Veprinsky, 87 F.3d at 891 (holding that a retaliation claim by a
current employee need only be based on an adverse action of the employer and not necessarily
employment related while a claim by a former employee must involve an adverse action with
a nexus to an employment relationship). At least one circuit requires the adverse action to be
related to an employment relationship. Nelson v. Upsala Coll., 51 F.3d 383, 389 (3d Cir. 1995)
(concluding that adverse action must have an "impact on any employment relationship that [the
employee] had, or might have in the future"), criticized in EEOC v. Die Fliedermaus, L.L.C.,
77 F. Supp. 2d 460,472 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). See generally Essary & Friedman, supra note 30,
at 133 (concluding that the definition of adverse action is a three-way circuit split, the third
[Vol. 76:191
OVERCOMING ADVERSITY
in the aggregate may constitute an adverse employment action."° In Gunnell v. Utah
Valley State College,'"7 the Tenth Circuit expanded the realm of adverse actions to
include a claim of harassment by coworkers.' The court recognized "that co-worker
hostility or retaliatory harassment, if sufficiently severe, may constitute 'adverse
employment action' for purposes of a retaliation claim." However, "an employer
can only be liable for co-workers' retaliatory harassment where supervisory or
management personnel either (1) orchestrate the harassment or (2) know about the
harassment and acquiesce in it.""10 Aside from the Tenth Circuit's recognition of a
retaliatory hostile environment claim, "'mere ostracism' by co-workers does not
constitute an adverse employment action.'
The majority generally limits the statute to those actions "cognizable as an adverse
employment action if it is reasonably likely to deter employees from engaging in
protected activity."'"2 "Concededly, not every unpleasant matter.., creates a cause
of action, but many things, such as constant rudeness, conspicuous discriminatory
acts, etc., could have an adverse effect upon employment.... [A] case by case review
is necessary."'" 3 Adverse employment actions may include the bringing of criminal
charges, negative performance evaluations, transfers to lesser positions,
disadvantageous job assignments, denial of a lunch break, and even the cancellation
of a public event in honor of the employee."4 The majority requires the employer's
retaliatory acts be intended to discourage protected activity by employees, and the
inquiry must be performed case by case."'
B. The Reasoning of the Majority
The majority initially argues that requiring retaliatory discrimination to reach only
ultimate employment decisions is contrary to the plain language of the statute. The
majority points directly to the language in .the text of section 704(a): "The
[minority's] contrary position is inconsistent with the plain language of [section
704(a)], which makes it 'unlawft4 to discriminate against any of his employees...
because he has made a charge.. . .' Read in the light of ordinary understanding, the
term'discriminate' is not limited to 'ultimate employment decisions."'. 6 Unlike other
prong being those courts which require the impact be related to employment).
106. See, e.g., Rousselle v. GTE Directories Corp., 85 F. Supp. 2d 1286, 1292 (M.D. Fla.
2000) ("Several employment actions considered collectively and in the totality of the
circumstances may be deemed adverse and sufficient to prohibit discrimination.").
107. 152 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir. 1998).
108. Id. at 1264; see also Fielder v. UAL Corp., 218 F.3d 973 (9th Cir. 2000) (adopting
Tenth Circuit's decision in Gunnell).
109. Gunnell, 152 F.3d at 1264.
110. Id. at 1265.
111. Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1241 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Strother v. S. Cal.
Pernanente Med. Group, 79 F.3d 859, 869 (9th Cir. 1996)).
112. Id. at 1243.
113. Welsh v. Derwinski, 14 F.3d 85, 86 (1st Cir. 1994).
114. Ray, 217 F.3d at 1243.
115. Aviles v. Cornell Forge Co., 183 F.3d 598, 605 (7th Cir. 1999).
116. Wideman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 141 F.3d 1453, 1456 (1 1th Cir. 1998) (emphasis
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sections of the statute, the term "discriminate" is not surrounded by qualifiers or
limitations." 7
Consider the prohibitions contained in section 703 of Title VII." The general
prohibitions defining unlawful employment practices under Title VII define
"discriminate" with the qualification that it be "with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employmenf""' or utilize other language such as
the prohibition "to limit, segregate, or classify his employees ... which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities."'"2 Section
703 stands in stark contrast to the limitless language of section 704(a), which utilizes
broad language that seems to set no substantive or temporal limitations. 2 '
The liberal construction given by courts is based upon a concern for the chilling
effect retaliation has on reporting and enforcement. The majority view emphasizes
the importance of the employee in the statutory scheme. As previously recognized by
the Supreme Court:
Individual grievants usually initiate the [EEOC's] investigatory and conciliatory
procedures. And although the 1972 amendment to Title VII empowers the
Commission to bring its own actions, the private right of action remains an
essential means of obtainingjudicial enforcement of Title VII. In such cases, the
private litigant not only redresses his own injury but also vindicates the important
congressional policy against discriminatory employment practices."
In keeping with this policy, the antiretaliation provision is crucial in assuring that the
vital role of the employee is protected. Given the broad remedial purpose of Title VII
in eradicating invidious employment discrimination throughout the nation, section
704(a) ensures open lines of communication between the individual, either as witness
or victim, and the federal government via the EEOC or the courts." As a result of
section 704(a)'s importance in the statutory scheme, courts willingly define the terms
added).
117. Essary & Feldman, supra note 30, at 140-41.
118. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994).
119. Id.
120. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(2).
121. See, e.g., Veprinsky v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., 87 F.3d 881, 891-92 (7th Cir. 1996)
(comparing section 704(a) with section 703(a)(1)). This argument has been put forward not
only by the courts, but also is the official position of the EEOC:
The anti-retaliation provisions are exceptionally broad. Theymake it unlawful "to
discriminate" against an individual because of his or her protected activity. This
is in contrast to the general anti-discrimination provisions which make it unlawful
to discriminate with respect to an individual's "terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment." The retaliation provisions set no qualifiers on the term "to
discriminate," and therefore prohibit any discrimination that is reasonably likely
to deter protected activity.
U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL (NEW) § 8-1
(1998), available at http:/www.eeoc.gov/docs/retal.html (last modified July 6, 2000).
122. Veprinsky, 87 F.3d at 889 (alteration in original) (quoting Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Co., 415 U.S. 36,45 (1974) (citations omitted)).
123. Id.
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with a liberal perspective.'2
The majority of courts are further concerned with the numerous forms of
retaliation:
"This provision regarding retaliation may intentionally be broader, since it is
obvious that effective retaliation against employment discrimination need not
take the form of a job action. Shooting a person for filing a complaint of
discrimination would be an effective method ofretaliation," although the victim
would have other, more powerful remedies than a suit under Title VII.'1
Thus, when considering section 704(a), courts construe the language liberally to
ensure adequate coverage and not discourage reporting by employees.'26 Retaliation
"is likely to cause irreparable harm to the public interest in enforcing the law by
deterring others from filing charges."' 27 A narrow interpretation of section 704(a)
would allow employers to retaliate with impunity so long as it does not rise to the
level of an ultimate employment decision.'28
124. E.g., id. at 888-89 ("It has long been recognized that Title VII is a remedial statute with
a broad sweep.... We have thus construed Title VII liberally, in keeping with its remedial
purpose.'); Berryv. Stevinson Chevrolet, 74 F.3d 980,986 (10th Cir. 1996) (Title VII "'which
is remedial in nature should be liberally construed."' (quoting Rutherford v. Am. Bank of
Commerce, 565 F.2d 1162, 1165 (10th Cir. 1977))).
125. Aviles v. Comell Forge Co., 183 F.3d 598, 605 (7th Cir. 1999) (quoting McDonnell
v. Cisneros, 84 F.3d 256, 259 (7th Cir. 1996)).
126. See, e.g., Wideman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 141 F.3d 1453, 1456 (1 1th Cir. 1998)
("Permitting employers to discriminate against an employee who files a charge.., so long as
[it] does not constitute an ultimate employment action, could stifle employees' willingness to
file charges of discrimination."); McKnight v. Gen. Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 104, 111 (7th Cir.
1990) (discussing in context of a § 1981 claim that a "threat to retaliate is a common method
of deterrence"); Holt v. Cont'l Group, Inc., 708 F.2d 87, 91 (2d Cir. 1983) (noting retaliation
"carries with it the distinct risk that other employees may be deterred from.., providing
testimony").
127. Garcia v. Lawn, 805 F.2d 1400, 1405 (9th Cir. 1986).
128. In Fielder v. UAL Corp., 218 F.3d 973 (9th Cir. 2000), the Ninth Circuit commented:
As the [Eleventh Circuit explained], "the term 'discriminate' is not limited to
'ultimate employment decisions."' If the statute were to be interpreted in a strict
manner, employers could retaliate at will so long as the retaliation does not
constitute an ultimate employment decision or rise to the level of a constructive
discharge.
Id. at (quoting Wideman, 141 F.3d at 1456).
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III. MINORITY VIEW 29
"The federal courts cannot be wheeled into action for every
workplace slight, even one that was possibly based on
protected conduct."'3
In several circuits, courts have construed "discriminate" to encompass only
employment decisions that are deemed to be "ultimate.'' Although no clear rule is
set, these employer decisions usually require serious economic effects on the
employee.' A few courts in the minority argue that the language of section 704(a)
itself requires the restriction, while other courts seek support from an original
statutory understanding. In addition, the intrusiveness of a lower standard on
management decisionmaking accentuates the position of the minority.
A. The Minority's Rule of "Ultimate Employment Decisions"
"Title VII was designed to address ultimate employment decisions, not to address
every decision made by employers that arguably might have some tangential effect
upon those ultimate decisions."' The decisions under this doctrine require an
economically adverse implication to an employee's position.' Thus, obvious
personnel actions falling within this gambit include "'hiring, granting leave,
discharging, promoting, and compensating.""" However, lesser personnel actions,
such as reassignments or transfers, are not sufficient to support retaliation claims
because these actions do not materially affect an employee's terms or conditions of
employment. 3 6 Essentially, as part of the prima facie case of retaliation, the plaintiff
129. The members of the minority include the Fifth and Eighth Circuits. Burger v. Cent.
Apartment Mgmt., Inc., 168 F.3d 875, 878 (5th Cir. 1999); Ledergerber v. Stangler, 122 F.3d
1142 (8th Cir. 1997). The Ninth Circuit in Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234 (9th Cir. 2000),
suggests that a three way split exists. Id. at 1242. The court argues that the Second and Third
Circuits take a middle of the road approach, namely, that the adverse action "materially affects
the terms and conditions of employment." Id. However, this language appears very similar to
that used by the Eighth Circuit, which is in the minority. See infra note 134. Indeed, the Third
Circuit appears ready to join the minority. See Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286,
1300 (3d Cir. 1997).
130. Taylor v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 132 F.3d 753, 765 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (emphasis
added).
131. See, e.g., Burger, 168 F.3d at 878 ("ultimate employment decisions'; Ledergerber,
122 F.3d at 1144 ("materially significant disadvantage").
132. Burger, 168 F.3d at 878.
133. Dollis v. Rubin, 77 F.3d 777, 781-82 (5th Cir. 1995).
134. Ledergerber, 122 F.3d at 114445 (stating that evidence must show that an employer
"materially altered the terms or conditions of her employment").
135. Mattem v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702,707 (5th Cir. 1997) (quotingDollis, 77
F.3d at 782).
136. See Harlston v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 37 F.3d 379 (8th Cir. 1994). In Harlston,
the plaintiff was reassigned to a different position which did not effect changes in
compensation or title, but the plaintiff argued she had less of her normal secretarial duties and
more stress. Id. at 381-82. The court affirmed summaryjudgment for the employer, noting that
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must allege that the action taken by his employer materially affected his or her terms
or conditions of employment." 7
For example, inLedergerber v. Stangler," the plaintiff, Diane Ledergerber, served
as a maintenance supervisor for the defendant employer and had made allegations
towards the management of racial favoritism. 39 After the employer changed
Ledergerber's entire staff without changing her compensation, benefits, title or
location, Ledergerber brought suit allegingrace discrimination and retaliation.'" The
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment in favor of the
employer, noting Ledergerber's failure to show that the exchange of staff "somehow
materially altered the terms or conditions of her employment.' 4 The court
commented:
In order to overcome her initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of
discrimination or retaliation, appellant was required to show, among other things,
that she suffered an adverse employment action that affected the terms or
conditions of her employment .... The district court believed that appellant
satisfied this burden by a loss of status and prestige with the reassignment of her
staff. We conclude, however, that appellant failed to establish how such
consequences effectuated a material change in the terms or conditions of her
employment. While the action complained of may have had a tangential effect on
her employment, it did not rise to the level of an ultimate employment decision
intended to be actionable under Title VII' 4
This heightened standard of requiring materiality in the minority of circuits for
section 704(a) is based on several reasons.
B. The Minority's Reasoning for a Heightened Standard
At least one court in the minority claims that the plain language of section 704(a)
itself demands such a narrow interpretation.'43 In Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co.,'"
a case discussed in the Introduction, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals examined the
language of section 704(a) to determine the level of adverse action required for
retaliation.' In concluding that the retaliation provision refers only to ultimate
employment decisions, the Fifth Circuit stated that, "[o]bviously, this reading is
grounded in the language of Title VII."'" The court then set out to define
"discriminate" in section 704(a), and stated "we look, of course, to other Title VII
"[c]hanges in duties or working conditions that cause no materially significant disadvantage
... are insufficient to establish the adverse conduct required to make a prima facie case." Id.
at 382.
137. Id.
138. 122 F.3d 1142(8th Cir. 1997).
139. Id. at 1143.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1144-45.
142. Id. at 1144.
143. See Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702,708 (5th Cir. 1997).
144. 104 F.3d 702 (5th Cir. 1997).
145. Id. at 708-09.
146. Id. at 708.
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sections for guidance; in this case, the preceding section is helpful."' 47 The previous
section, section 703, sets out the general prohibitions against discrimination. Under
section 703(a)(1), it is unlawful for an employer" "to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment," while
in section 703(a)(2) it is unlawful "to limit, segregate, or classify his employees...
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex or nation origin."'48 The Fifth Circuit noted that
in section 704(a) "there is no mention of the vague harms contemplated in [section
703(a)(2)]. Therefore, this provision can only be read to exclude such vague harms,
and to include only ultimate employment decisions."'49 The Fifth Circuit reiterated
its conclusion two years later, explaining that the language of section 704(a) was
more analogous to section 703(a)(1) than section 703(a)(2) and therefore should be
interpreted in the same manner as the former.
50
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals seems to be following the Fifth Circuit's lead.
In Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, a city police officer complained that one of her
supervisors sexually harassed her. After filing a charge with the EEOC, she was
subjected to "restrictedjob duties, reassignment and subsequent failure to transfer her
out of an assignment in which she was under the direct command of the alleged
harasser, and the issuance of several unsubstantiated oral reprimands against her."'52
In rejecting her retaliation claim, the court noted that section 704(a) merely creates
an unlawful employment practice and that the restrictions placed on unlawful
employment practices under the general prohibitions of section 703 apply.
[A]ccordingly just as we concluded that a quid pro quo plaintiff must show a
"quo" that is serious enough to alter his or her "compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges" of employment, we hold that the "adverse employment action"
element of a retaliation plaintiff's prima facie case incorporates the same
requirement that the retaliatory conduct rise to the level of a violation of [section
703]. 4
Other circuits in the minority based their conclusion on an original understanding
of the general provision barring employment discrimination, stating that Title VII was
intended only to cover those discriminatory actions which were deemed ultimate
employment, decisions or, in other words, affected the terms and conditions of
employment. '55 Originally, instead ofrepeating the language ofthe general provisions
147. Id.
148. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2) (1994).
149. Mattern, 104 F.3d at 709.
150. Burger v. Cent. Apartment Mgmt. Inc., 168 F.3d 875, 878 (5th Cir. 1999).
151. 120F.3d 1286 (3d Cir. 1997).
152. Id. at 1300.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1300-01.
155. See, e.g., Dollis v. Rubin, 77 F.3d 777,781-82 (5th Cir. 1995) ("Title VII was designed
to address ultimate employment decisions, not to address every decision made by employers
that arguably might have some tangential effect upon those ultimate decisions." (citing Page
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against discriminating in "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,"'56 the
courts utilized "adverse employment action" as a shorthand.'57 Vventually, as case law
diverged, the use of terms "ultimate employment decision" and "materially adverse"
action developed.'58 When faced with claims of discrimination, courts required an
action by the employer that was either materially adverse or that constituted an
ultimate employment decision.59 In construing section 704(a), courts in the minority
concluded that retaliation claims were subject to the same heightened requirement of
material adversity as general claims of discrimination,'" a conclusion which has
received heavy criticism. 6'
Underlying the requirement of material adversity is a concern by the courts for
intrusion into the employer's ability to properly operate a business. "'Perhaps in
recognition of the judicial micromanagement of business practices that would result
if [courts] ruled otherwise, other circuits have held that changes in assignments or
work-related duties do not ordinarily constitute adverse employment decisions if
unaccompanied by a decrease in salary or work hour changes."" 62 The concern for
v. Bolger, 645 F.2d 227, 233 (4th Cir. 1981))).
156. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994).
157. Lidge, supra note 59, at 347.
158. Id. at 346-67.
159. See, e.g., Burger v. Cent. Apartment Mgmt., Inc., 168 F.3d 875, 878 (5th Cir. 1999);
Ledergerber v. Stangler, 122 F.3d 1142, 1144 (8th Cir. 1997).
160. See, e.g., Dollis, 77 F.3d at 781-82. Although the claim inDollis was retaliation under
section 704(a), the Fifth Circuit adopted the Fourth Circuit's analysis in Page v. Bolger, 645
F.2d 227,233 (4th Cir.198 1). In Page, the court concluded that a disparate impact claim under
section 717 of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a)(l) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998), required the
employer's action to rise to the level of an "ultimate employment decision." Page, 645 F.2d
at 233. In Lederberger, the Eighth Circuit required the plaintiff to prove a "materially
significant disadvantage" affecting the plaintiff's terms or conditions of employment, relying
on its own precedent and citing as controlling Harlston. Lederberger v. Stangler, 122 F.3d
1142, 1144 (8th Cir. 1997) (citing Harlston v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 37 F.3d 379, 382
(8th Cir. 1994)).
161. See Lidge, supra note 59, at 346-403. Professor Ernest F. Lidge's article begins by
noting that what originated as a shorthand designation for the adverse action element of a
plaintiff's prima facie case for discrimination or retaliation became a substantive doctrine of
law requiring a heightened level of adverse action. Lidge argues that no claims under Title VII
should be required to meet the heightened standard of an ultimate employment decision. Id. at
409-12. While Lidge is supported by strong policy considerations, it appears contrary to the
unique language of each section and the logic of the Supreme Court precedent. The gravamen
of the argument of this Note is that the retaliation provision, section 704(a), is substantially
different than the general prohibitions against discrimination contained within other sections
of the statute and thus is not subject to the heightened standard given this section by the
minority of circuits. Lidge's argument would give no meaning to the differing language of each
section underTitle VII. Compare42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3. The majority
of circuits have exempted the retaliation provision from such a standard based on the rationale
previously discussed in Part II.
162. Brown v. Brody, 199 F.3d 446, 452 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (analyzing the requirement of
adverse employment action in racial discrimination and retaliation claim) (alteration in
original) (quoting Mungin v. Katten, Muchin & Zavis, 116 F.3d 1549, 1556-57 (D.C. Cir.
1997)).
2001]
INDIANA LAWJOURNAL
weighing the statute's broad remedial purpose with the effective management of
employees resurfaces. "We "'balance the purpose of the Act to protect persons
engaging reasonably in activities opposing... discrimination, against Congress's
equally manifest desire not to tie the hands of employers in the objective selection
and control of personnel. '  Perhaps implicit in court commentary is the concern
first voiced by Congressman Watson for the professional complaint filer."a Based on
the plain language of the statute, the extension of a controversial doctrine, and a
considerable policy concern, the minority requires as part of a prima facie case of
retaliation that the plaintiff show an adverse employment action or an ultimate
employment decision.
IV. A PREDICTION IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
"[Luike beauty, ambiguity is in the eye of the beholder.,,65
An attempt to discern the true meaning of "to discriminate" under section 704(a)
mustbegin with the final authority on federal law, the Supreme Court. Several recent
Supreme Court decisions provide guidance and support for broadly construing section
704(a)'s coverage. In addition, numerous arguments support the conclusion that
section 704(a) requires a lower threshold of adverse action than the general
prohibitions.
163. Laughlin v. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth.,149 F.3d 253,259 (4th Cir. 1998) (quoting
Armstrong v. Index Journal Co., 647 F.2d 441, 448 (4th Cir 1981) (quoting Hochstadt v.
Worcester Found. for Experimental Biology, 545 F.2d 222, 231 (1st Cir. 1976))).
164. See supra Part I. A quote by Chief Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit is often cited
with approval by the minority:
[A] transfer that does not involve a demotion in form or substance, cannot rise to
the level of a materially adverse employment action. A transfer involving no
reduction in pay and no more than a minor change in working conditions will not
do, either. Otherwise every trivial personnel action that an irritable, chip-on-the-
shoulder employee did not like would form the basis of a discrimination suit. The
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, already staggering under an
avalanche of filings too heavy for it to cope with, would be crushed, and serious
complaints would be lost among the trivial.
Burger, 168 F.3d at 879 (quoting Williams v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 85 F.3d 270, 274
(7th Cir. 1996)); see also Ledergerber, 122 F.3d at 1144 (quoting a similar portion ofPosner's
quotation).
165. Philip P. Frickey, Revisiting the Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation: A
Lecture in Honor of Irving Younger, 84 MINN. L. REv. 199, 214 (1999) (discussing the
decision by the Supreme Court in Robinson) (emphasis added).
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A. The Supreme Court's Statutory Construction
of "Employees" in Robinson
The unanimous decision by the Court in Robinson caught many off-guard." The
Court tackled the problem of interpreting the term "employees" within the meaning
of section 704(a). 67 On appeal fromthe Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, which had
narrowly construed the term to mean only current employees, Justice Thomas,
speaking for the Court, first assessed whether the term suffered from ambiguity
within the statute. 63 "Our first step... is to determine whether the language at issue
has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the
case.""69 The Court utilized three factors in its determination ofwhether "employees"
was ambiguous: (1) examining the actual language of the section, (2) "the specific
context in which that language is used," and (3) construing the language within the
broader context of the statute.170
The Court first examined the use of the term "employees" and deemed it "at first
blush" to mean those employees presently employed.' "This initial impression,
however, does not withstand scrutiny in the context of§ 704(a)."' 72 The Court noted
there is no indication in the language that would set temporal qualifications on
"employees."' Since the term is not limited by such qualifiers, it could just as easily
be construed to include former employees. Moreover, other sections use
"'employees' to mean something more inclusive or different than 'current
employees.""' Justice Thomas concluded that the term was ambiguous as to its
meaning. 
6
For the next step in determining the meaning of an ambiguous term, "each section
must be analyzed to determine whether the context gives the term a further meaning
that would resolve the issue in dispute."'" Justice Thomas explained that "[t]he
broader context provided by other sections of the statute provides considerable
assistance in this regard."'7 8 Several sections of Title VII plainly intended to include
former employees within the meaning of "employees," while other sections, such as
the jurisdictional requirement of fifteen or more employees, did not.7 9 Most
166. See Fenn, supra note 26, at 561 ("Although the fact that the Court ruled in favor of a
broad interpretation is not surprising, the fact that it was a unanimous decision is."); Frickey,
supra note 165, at 214 ("I was quite surprised when the Supreme Court reversed
unanimously-in an opinion by Justice Thomas!').
167. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 339 (1997).
168. Id. at 340.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 341.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 342.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 341.
177. Id. at 343-44.
178. Id. at 345.
179. Id. at 341 n.2.
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important to Justice Thomas was the fact that filing a charge of discrimination for an
unlawful discharge was conduct protected by section 704(a), yet former employees
would not be able to invoke the section's protection against retaliation under the
Fourth Circuit's interpretation. 0 The Fourth Circuit's interpretation "would
effectively vitiate much of the protection afforded by § 704(a)."'' Noting the
section's concern for the chilling effect on reporting and the primary purpose of
section 704(a) in protecting the statute's remedial mechanisms, Thomas declared "it
would be destructive of this purpose of the antiretaliation provision for an employer
to be able to retaliate with impunity against an entire class of acts under Title VII."''
Justice Thomas concluded that Congress intended for section 704(a)'s protection to
include former employees."
B. Robinson Applied to "Discriminate"
Applying the principles set out by Justice Thomas in Robinson demands the same
result in interpreting "discriminate" within the meaning of section 704(a): a broad
reading. At first glance, "discriminate" is ambiguous as to its meaning. There is no
indication of a certain level of substantiality required by the term-indeed, it could
mean the slightest of differences. Taken in the specific context of the section, there
are no temporal or substantive qualifiers. While other sections bar discrimination as
to "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment," section 704(a) speaks only of
discrimination. The only true requirement is that the employer discriminate because
the employee engaged in protected activity, but this sets no restrictions on the type
of discrimination necessary to constitute retaliation. Finally, other sections use other
qualifiers to limit the prohibited discrimination, while section 704(a) does not entail
such limitations. Understanding the three factors as delineated by Justice Thomas in
Robinson, it is clear that the language "to discriminate" is ambiguous.
Moving to the next step in the process requires considering the broad context of
Title VII, other sections of the statute, and the important purpose of the antiretaliation
provision-all of these shed light on the appropriate interpretation of section 704(a).
The primary or general antidiscrimination provision of Title VII, section 703, speaks
of many qualifications of discrimination. Aside from requiring the discrimination to
be "because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin," the
provision limits the discrimination prohibited to thatwhich affects "his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.""' Moreover, section 703(a)(2)
provides that an employer may not "limit, segregate, or classify employees... in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee."'85 As for
employment agencies, Title VII makes it unlawful for an agency "to fail or refuse to
refer for employment, or otherwise to discriminate against" an individual in a
180. Id. at 345.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 346.
183. Id.
184. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994).
185. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(2).
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protected class. 8 6 Labor organizations are not to exclude or expel from membership
"4or otherwise to discriminate against" such an individual."7 In addition, a labor
organization may not engage in discriminatory segregation or classification of its
members.'88 Perhaps most demonstrative is the final prohibition imposed on labor
organizations: "to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an
individual in violation of this section." 89 This provision most closely resembles
section 704(a), yet still qualifies discrimination to that which causes or attempts to
cause an employer to violate Title VII. Admittedly, section 703(a)(2) has the
broadest language, but the section does not utilize the term "discriminate" and is
limited to that which "adversely affect[s]" the employee's status. None of the
provisions in section 703 seem to have the boundless language of section 704(a).
As the Court noted in Robinson, section 704(a) in particular demands a broad
interpretation. A narrow reading would "undermine the effectiveness of Title VII"'
by allowing lesser office slights to chill protected activity. Eventually, retaliatory
slights not ultimate in nature may drive an employee to leave the employer. Given that
claims of constructive discharge or retaliatory harassment have had little success in
the appellate courts, 9' an employer, by making an example out of one employee
through poor workplace treatment, will be successful in deterring "victims of
discrimination from complaining to the EEOC."'' The destructive nature of an
employer being able to retain an employee and subject him to adverse conditions,
such as condoning fellow employee harassment, is an obvious statutory concern.
More importantly, while section 703(a)(1) has been interpreted to include racial or
sexual harassment based on an aggregate of harassing events, this broad
understanding of that particular section was, for some unknown reason, not extended
to section 704(a) by the courts in the minority.93
C. The Supreme Court Suggests a Standard in Ellerth
In 1998, the Supreme Court handed down a Title VII case that had a serious impact
on federal employment discrimination law. The Court, in Burlington Industries, Inc.
v. Ellerth, 94 attempted to clarify the law surrounding claims of sexual harassment. In
Ellerth, the Court established when an employer would be vicariously liable for the
acts of supervisors and when the employer would have an available affirmative
defense. 95
186. Id. § 2000e-2(b).
187. Id. § 2000e-2(c)(1).
188. Id. § 2000e-2(c)(2).
189. Id. § 2000e-2(c)(3).
190. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997).
191. See, e.g., Munday v. Waste Mgmt. Inc., 126 F.3d 239, 244 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding
plaintiff failed to prove that "working conditions were intolerable").
192. Robinson, 519 U.S. at 346; accord Hashimoto v. Dalton, 118 F.3d 671,676 (9th Cir.
1997) (noting the "chilling effect" that adopting a narrow interpretation would have on other
employees).
193. See infra note 224 and accompanying text.
194. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
195. Id. at 761-63.
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According to the Court, when the supervisor subjects the employee to a "tangible
employment action," the employer is vicariously liable for the actions of the
supervisor. ' The Court stated that a "tangible employment action" exists when the
"action constitutes a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing,
failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a
decision causing a significant change in benefits.... A tangible employment action
in most cases inflicts a direct economic harm."' 9 All the actions listed result in an
adverse economic impact upon the employee and are therefore arguably ultimate
decisions.
However, in a situation where the supervisor's harassment does not "[culminate]
in a tangible employment action," the employer is entitled to raise a two-part
affirmative defense. 9 ' The key limitation to this portion of the opinion is that the
affirmative defense is available in situations of harassment-that is, harassment
which results in "either explicit or constructive alterations in the terms or conditions
of employment."'" Again, this did not recognize a new area of adverse actions
because hostile working environments were already considered to be a sufficiently
adverse employment action by all circuits."° Therefore, contrary to the suggestions
of some,2 ' the Court did not recognize lesser employment actions in the context of
the general prohibiti6ns.2°
This decision would not appear to answer the question now under discussion.
However, the Court's opinion has put an explicit limitation on this discussion.
According to the Court, the concept of a tangible employment action was limited to
"claims involving race, age, and national origin discrimination, as well as sex
discrimination." ' 3 Noticeably absent from this list are retaliation claims. Although
the discussion of tangible employment actions was entirely dicta,2' the Court's
noticeable exclusion of retaliation claims may indicate its willingness to set the
standard lower in that context.
D. Section 704(a): A Critical Cog in the Statutory Wheel
The Court in Robinson was brief in its analysis, but there exists additional support
for a broad construction of "discriminate" under the antiretaliation provision as
opposed to other sections. In Mattern, the actions of fellow employees and the
employer in retaliation for protected activity ultimately led to the victim's
196. Id. at 760-61.
197. Id. at 761-62.
198. Id. at 765.
199. Id. at 752.
200. Id.
201. E.g., Lidge, supra note 59, at 383-84 (arguing that since the Court divided sexual
harassment cases into two categories-those with tangible employment actions and those
without-then the Court must recognize employment actions less than ultimate decisions).
202. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 752.
203. Id. at 761.
204. "Without endorsing the specific results of [circuit-court tangible employment action]
decisions, we think it prudent to import the concept of a tangible employment action for
resolution of the vicarious liability issue we consider here." Id.
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resignation. °5 Perhaps the most successful method to ensure other employees do not
follow in a "complaining" employee's footsteps is to keep that employee and
ostracize him in front of the other employees. If a crucial purpose of the
antiretaliation provision is to prevent employers from deterring protected activity,
then the interpretation cannot be limited to traditional forms of discrimination but
should encompass the range of possible retaliatory actions thought of by the human
mind. To suggest that a narrower definition under section 704(a) leads to less
litigation is not empirically supported, especially considering the recent trend of
increased litigation on retaliation claims.
This rule does admittedly increase the potential liability of a business, yet a
narrower rule would stifle the enforcement mechanisms of Title VlI.2° Businesses
will need to consider specialized training programs designed to aid supervisors in
dealing with retaliation situations, not just discrimination. A line drawn at the
majority's level of substantiality only requires what a well-operated business
maintains in the first place: records. Although liability for fellow employee
harassment ordered by a supervisor cannot be curbed by proper documentation,
properly maintained records regarding everyday business decisions will effectively
immunize an employer from liability by providing a non-pretextual reason for the
action." 7 A clear example is available inMontandon v. Farnland Industries, Inc.,
2°5
where an employee alleged sexual harassment and retaliation for complaints he made
to management.2° The adverse actions claimed by the employee included a negative
evaluation and the employer's requiring him to move."' Affirming the district court,
the Eighth Circuit held that the employer "established legitimate nonretaliatory
reasons [for] both" adverse actions.21 ' In the case of each adverse action, the
employee's "document" history in the personnel file revealed and established the
legitimate reasons.'
12
Moreover, the minority's position sits upon questionable doctrinal underpinnings.
The plain-language argument does not follow the Robinson framework and is
unconvincing. Assuming that section 704(a) utilizes language more similar to section
703(a)(1) than 703(a)(2) does not support the contention it should be interpreted as
such. Unlike section 704(a), section 703(a)(1) clearly sets qualifications on
"discriminate" which are not in the antiretaliation provision. The language of section
704(a) directly contradicts the plain-text argument put forth by the Fifth Circuit in
205. Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702,703-04 (5th Cir. 1997).
206. Essary & Friedman, supra note 30, at 152 ("Despite the 'ultimate employment
decision' courts' zeal to protect employers from being unduly restricted in disciplining their
employees, the courts' harsh, unyielding standard practically encourages employers to retaliate
against protected employees in numerous intangible manners which, in their totality, may in
fact be as tangible.').
207. See, e.g., Harris v. King, No. 98-5826,2000 WL353676, at *4 (6th Cir. Mar. 29,2000)
(unpublished table opinion) (finding submitted documents sufficient to support defendant's
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason).
208. 116 F.3d 355 (8th Cir. 1997).
209. Id. at 357.
210. Id. at 359-60.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 360.
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Mattern. In addition, the circuits relying on the previous understanding that Title VII
coverage only extends to ultimate employment decisions places a misguided reliance
primarily on the Fourth Circuit's discussion of section 717 in Page."3 The Fourth
Circuit in that case addressed the addition of section 717, as an amendment to Title
VII, which expanded coverage to federal employees." 4 Yet the language of Page
made clear that it was not intended as a rule set in stone, but only for that singular
case." 5 As the dissent in Mattern pointed out, there is little logic in limiting section
704(a)'s reach by an interpretation of an amendment intending to expand Title VIi's
coverage.2"6 Even recent cases question whether the Fourth Circuit's opinion in Page,
relied on by the minority, will be applied to a retaliation claim within that circuit.217
Retaliation provisions under federal law are traditionally broader then general
provisions. Several labor statutes contain provisions prohibiting retaliation against
employees.2 ' The ADEA most closely compares with Title VII. 219 Under the ADEA,
the primary prohibition makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer
to discriminate based on age in hiring, firing, or otherwise "with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment."" 0 The retaliation
provision contains no qualification to elements of employment, only that an employer
is not "to discriminate against any of his employees."'" Under the FLSA, which
ensures appropriate wages for employees,'m the law provides broad coverage for
213. See, e.g., Dollis v. Rubin, 77 F.3d 777, 781-82 (5th Cir. 1995) (discussing adverse
actions under retaliation claim and citing Page as authoritative).
214. Mattem v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 716 (5th Cir. 1997) (Dennis, J.,
dissenting) (discussing Page v. Bolger, 645 F.2d 227 (4th Cir. 1981)).
215. Page v. Bolger, 645 F.2d 227, 233 (4th Cir. 1981) ("[W]e suggest no general test for
defining those 'ultimate employment decisions' which alone should be held directly covered
by § 717 and comparable antidiscrimination provisions under Title VII.").
216. Mattern, 104 F.3d at 716 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
217. See McNair v. Computer Data Sys., Inc., No. 98-1110, 1999 WL 30959, at *6 (4th Cir.
Jan. 26, 1999) (affirming the district court "without proceeding to the contested question
whether the Page v. Bolger standard for adverse employment actions in discrimination claims
brought under section 2000e-2(a) is applicable in the context of a claim of prohibited
retaliation brought under the differently worded section 2000e-3(a)").
218. Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) of 1967 § 4, 29 U.S.C. § 623(d)
(1994); Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) of 1938 § 15, 29 U.S.C. § 215 (1994); National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA) § 8(a), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1994); Occupational Safety and
Health Act (OSHA) of 1970 § l1(c)(l), 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(1) (1994); Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1991 § 503, 42 U.S.C. § 12203 (1994). The Equal Pay Act of 1963
("EPA"), which prohibits discrimination in pay between the sexes, is an amendment to the Fair
Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), and therefore the antiretaliation provision applies. See 29
U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1994) (providing for a general prohibition against discrimination in
wages); Brock v. Ga. Southwestern Coll., 765 F.2d 1026, 1032 (1 Ith Cir. 1985) (concluding
that the FLSA antiretaliation provision maybe utilized within the enforcement mechanisms of
the EPA).
219. Supra note 39 and accompanying text.
220. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1).
221. Id. § 623(d).
222. 29 U.S.C. §§ 206-207 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
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employees who are involved in statutory investigations.' Other federal labor statutes
target explicit unlawful employer practices but provide broad coverage under the
respective retaliation provisions.'
Indeed, it is grossly incompatible with the statutory framework to narrowly
construe the retaliation provision while allowing a broad construction of the general
prohibitions. As members of legal academia have already pointed out, restricting the
retaliation clause to tangible adverse actions when the Supreme Court interprets the
general prohibitions to include a claim of"hostile work environment" appears entirely
inconsistent with the statute.? Under the hostile work environment theory, an
employee may sue under the general prohibitions for a racially or sexually hostile
environment---"neither economic harm nor psychological injury are necessary." P
The equivalent claim of hostile work environment based upon retaliation should be
available under the antiretaliationprovision because that provision contains even less
restrictive language. 7
223. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (1994). While the FLSA does not closely model employment
discrimination statutes, the retaliation provision's language provides assistance in
understanding the language used by Congress for such provisions because the language clearly
does not limit itself to wages. The FLSA, in pertinent part, prohibits any person
to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any employee because
such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or cause to be instituted
any proceeding under or related to this chapter, or has testified or is about to
testify in any such proceeding, or has served or is about to serve on an industry
committee.
Id.
224. The National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") and the Occupational Safety and Health
Act ("OSHA") contain identical qualifications in the retaliation provisions. Under the NLRA
"[i]t shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer ... to discharge or otherwise discriminate
against an employee because he has filed charges or given testimony under this subchapter."
Id. § 158(a)-(a)(4). Under OSHA "[n]o person shall discharge or in any manner discriminate
against any employee because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused
to be instituted anyproceeding underorrelated to this chapter."Id. § 660(c)(1). The Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994 & Supp.
IV 1998), governs a wide variety of employment benefit plans including pensions. See Hughes
Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 445-46 (1999). ERISA contains an antiretaliation
provision that makes it unlawful "for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel, discipline
or discriminate against a participant or beneficiary for exercising any right to which he is
entitled under the provisions of an employee benefit plan... [or] this title." 29 U.S.C. § 1140
(1994).
225. Essary & Friedman, supra note 30, at 141-42.
226. Id. at 141.
227. However, Essary & Friedman argue:
On one hand, [the minority]'s limited definition of adverse action renders a
retaliation claim far more limited than an underlying discrimination claim. On the
other hand, all courts, including [the minority], recoguize that a retaliation claim
may exist even when no actual discrimination has occurred, implying that
retaliation claims, by their very nature, have broader objectives than
discrimination claims.
Id. at 142. This argument is somewhat misguided. The objective of the general prohibitions is
to eradicate discrimination in the workplace, while the antiretaliation provision serves a
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Finally, there is good reason to distinguish between the unlawful employment
practices of other sections and section 704(a). The primary sections target invidious
discrimination as to terms and conditions of employment within the workplace based
on a person's status. These are the essential unlawful employment practices of the
statute and are restricted based on legislative debate to a certain level of substantiality
consistent with the aims of the statute. The individual employee is key to the
enforcement of Title VII and must be provided with blanket protection in order for
the statute to remain effective." 8 "Statutory provisions against retaliation such as
those in the ADEA and Title VII protect employees' right to participate in protected
activity and aid the work of the EEOC which depends upon employee
cooperation." 9 The employer is insulated to a degree under the primary provisions
because the discrimination must rise to an ascertainable level of substantiality.
When the employee has engaged in protected activity, the employer is on notice
that the statute is watching. Imagine a large employer with several thousand
employees and hundreds of supervisors. One shop supervisor makes sexual advances
toward one of the employees. The only proactive step the employer may have taken
is to properly screen, train, and monitor its supervisors." In all likelihood, those in
management will not be aware of the supervisor's actions." The harassment at issue
must meet a certain level of substantiality in order to impose liability on the
employer. 2 The harassment must be "severe and pervasive" as to alter the terms and
conditions of employment. 3 This requirement is consistent with the qualifiers for
discrimination under section 703(a)(1).' The employermust "discriminate" as to the
employee's "compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. '3 The
qualifiers keep out petty office slights that do not affect a person's working
conditions.
Now imagine that the employee files a charge of discrimination with the EEOC
claiming sexual harassment by the supervisor. The EEOC promptly notifies the
functional role in protecting Title VII's enforcement mechanisms. The antiretaliation provision
may apply despite the lack of discrimination based upon protected statutes because the
provision creates a separate protected class of those who oppose unlawful discrimination.
Therefore, a white male who opposes discrimination against black women is entitled to
statutory protection under the antiretaliation provision, even though he is not a member of the
protected class that is discriminated against.
228. Glover v. S.C. Law Enforcement Div., 170 F.3d 411,414 (4th Cir. 1999) ("Section
704(a)'s protections ensure not only that employers cannot intimidate their employees into
foregoing the Title VII grievance process, but also that investigators will have access to the
unchilled testimony of witnesses.").
229. EEOC v. Bd. of Governors, 957 F.2d 424,431 (7th Cir. 1992).
230. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 803 (1998).
231. If management is aware of the harassment, they have the opportunity to take adequate
remedial measures and thus avoid liability under Title VII. See Mattem v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
104 F.3d 702,704 (5th Cir. 1997) (finding that "prompt remedial action" excused an employer
from sexual harassment liability).
232. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65-66 (1986).
233. Id. at 67.
234. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1994).
235. Id.
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company that a charge of discrimination is now pending against the company. The
company is on notice and now has an opportunity to retroactively correct the situation
through increased training, removal of the supervisor, and settlement of the dispute
with the employee. If the company decides to retaliate against an employee for
utilizing Title VII's protection, it directly contravenes the statute on its face and
should be subject to additional liability beyond those under section 703. To not give
the retaliation section such effect is to make it a nullity, requiring the same level of
liability to the employer even though the employer has been put on notice that the
statute is watching.
Although this hypothetical is not typical, it demonstrates why the retaliation
provision deserves a broader interpretation than the remainder of the statute. The
employer is on notice and continuing discrimination against that employee is subject
to more statutory implications. As with the FLSA, which bars unfair compensation
practices yet prohibits discrimination in any manner against an employee who has
engaged in protected activity, Title VII targets unfair discrimination in the terms
and conditions of employment because of invidious discrimination based on a
person's status. However, if an employer without such invidious bias retaliates
against the employee-the vital cog in the enforcement wheel-the statute takes on
particular bite.
CONCLUSION
There is little support in the history, language, or purposes of section 704(a) that
requires an adverse action on an ultimate employment decision. Other views taken by
courts fail to account for the distinct language chosen by Congress in both the general
provisions and the antiretaliation provision. Moreover, in keeping with the Supreme
Court's position on section 704(a), the purposes of section 704(a) will only be
adequately effectuated by broad coverage. A narrow limitation would render section
704(a) a nullity and threaten the enforcement mechanisms under Title VII.
The rule set forth in the foregoing discussion lowers the bar for imposing liability
upon an employer. Yet this argument is limited only to retaliatory conduct under
section 704(a), and under the prima facie case, the employer has knowledge or notice
of potential liability. Thus, the heightened requirement of an ultimate employment
decision for the general discrimination provisions is left untouched. As the Supreme
Court recognized in Robinson, the antiretaliation provision is a special creature with
broad language intended to encompass actions beyond the normal workplace
decisions. The exact level at which the line should be drawn is not entirely clear, but
it should include those actions by an employer which an objectively reasonable
employee would construe as retaliation. The only ultimate decision which should
exist under section 704(a) is the ultimate decision left to the fact finder who must
determine whether the harm imposed by the employer stifles protected activity.
236. See supra text accompanying note 220.
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